Somaliland’s 30-year quest for recognition: could US interests make the difference?:
More than three decades after unilaterally declaring independence from Somalia, Somaliland still seeks international recognition as a sovereign state. Despite a lack of formal acknowledgement, the breakaway state has built a relatively stable system of governance. This has drawn increasing interest from global powers, including the United States. As regional dynamics shift and great-power competition intensifies, Somaliland’s bid for recognition is gaining new currency. Aleksi Ylönen has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He unpacks what’s at play.
What legal and historical arguments does Somaliland use?
The Somali National Movement is one of the main clan-based insurgent movements responsible for the collapse of the central government in Somalia. It claims the territory of the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The UK had granted Somaliland sovereign status on 26 June 1960.
The Somali government tried to stomp out calls for secession. It orchestrated the brutal killing of hundreds of thousands of people in northern Somalia between 1987 and 1989.
But the Somali National Movement declared unilateral independence on 18 May 1991 and separated from Somalia.
With the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, the movement’s main enemy was gone. This led to a violent power struggle between various militias.
This subsided only after the politician Mohamed Egal consolidated power. He was elected president of Somaliland in May 1993.
Egal made deals with merchants and businessmen, giving them tax and commercial incentives to accept his patronage. As a result, he obtained the economic means to consolidate political power and to pursue peace and state-building. It’s something his successors have kept up with since his death in 2002.
What has Somaliland done to push for recognition?
Successive Somaliland governments continue to engage in informal diplomacy. They have aligned with the west, particularly the US, which was the dominant power after the cold war, and the former colonial master, the UK. Both countries host significant Somaliland diaspora communities.
The US and the UK have for decades flirted with the idea of recognising Somaliland, which they consider a strategic partner. However, they have been repeatedly thrown back by their respective Somalia policies. These have favoured empowering the widely supported Mogadishu government to reassert its authority and control over Somali territories.
This Somalia policy has been increasingly questioned in recent years, in part due to Mogadishu’s security challenges. In contrast, the Hargeisa government of Somaliland has largely shown it can provide security and stability. It has held elections and survived as a state for the last three decades, though it has faced political resistance and armed opposition.
As new global powers rise, Somaliland administrations have pursued an increasingly diverse foreign policy, with one goal: international recognition.
Hargeisa hosts consulates and representative offices of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the UK and the European Union, among others.
The government has also engaged in informal foreign relations with the United Arab Emirates. The Middle Eastern monarchy serves as a business hub and a destination of livestock exports. Many Somalilanders migrate there.
Somaliland maintains representative offices in several countries. These include Canada, the US, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Taiwan. Hargeisa has alienated China because it has collaborated with Taiwan since 2020. Taiwan is a self-ruled island claimed by China.
On 1 January 2024, Somaliland’s outgoing president Muse Bihi signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed for increased cooperation. Bihi implied that Ethiopia would be the first country to formally recognise Somaliland. The deal caused a sharp deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.
Abiy later moderated his position and, with Turkish mediation, reconciled with his Somalia counterpart, President Hassan Mohamud.
What’s behind US interest in Somaliland?
The US, like other great powers, has been interested in Somaliland because of its strategic location. It is on the African shores of the Gulf of Aden, across from the Arabian Peninsula. Its geographical position has gained currency recently as Yemeni Houthi rebels strike maritime traffic in the busy shipping lanes. Somaliland is also well located to curb piracy and smuggling on this global trade route.
The US Africa Command set up its main Horn of Africa base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002. This followed the 11 September 2001 attacks.
Read more: Somaliland’s quest for recognition: UK debate offers hint of a sea change
In 2017, China, which had become the main foreign economic power in the Horn of Africa, set up a navy support facility in Djibouti. This encouraged closer collaboration between American and Somaliland authorities. The US played with the idea of establishing a base in Berbera, which hosts Somaliland’s largest port.
With Donald Trump winning the US presidential election in 2024, there were reports of an increased push for US recognition of Somaliland. This would allow the US to deepen its trade and security partnerships in the volatile Horn of Africa region.
Since March 2025, representatives of the Trump administration have engaged in talks with Somaliland officials to establish a US military base near Berbera. This would be in exchange for a formal but partial recognition of Somaliland.
What are the risks of US recognition of Somaliland?
Stronger US engagement with Somaliland risks neglecting Somalia.
Mogadishu depends on external military assistance in its battle against the advancing violent Islamist extremist group, Al-Shabaab. It also faces increasing defiance from two federal regions, Puntland and Jubaland.
US recognition would reward Hargeisa for its persistent effort to maintain stability and promote democracy. However, it could encourage other nations to recognise Somaliland. This would deliver a blow to Somali nationalists who want one state for all Somalis.
Aleksi Ylönen is affiliated with the Center for International Studies, Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and is an associate fellow at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies.
: The Conversation – Articles (AFRICA)
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